China and the Synthetic Drug Trade

Why geopolitics, not negligence, shapes the global narcotic industry 

Western media often depicts China’s role in the global drug economy through a simple, and politically convenient frame: Beijing sits at the heart of the synthetic drug era, manufacturing illicit drugs in opaque, poorly regulated markets. Researchers have detailed the complexity of China’s chemical industry in congressional reports; detractors, meanwhile, cite lax or fragmented regulation, and US officials frequently attribute the American opioid crisis to Chinese non-compliance. Yet, this narrative ignores a more nuanced reality, one that is dominated by the overlap of licit and illicit production, changing drug chemistry, structural industrial restrictions, and China’s accelerating domestic drug problem. 

Pharmaceutical challenges for Chinese authorities in the 1980s and 1990s were largely geographical. In south-west border areas, such as Yunnan, it was merely a transit route for heroin flow, not a major production hub (Swanström, 2006). This model of narcotics governance, however, centred on border enforcement, trafficking routes, and control of physical distribution networks. The subsequent rise of a synthetic market changed this model entirely. Synthetic substances are cheaper, more quickly produced, and much harder to regulate (UNODC, 2023). Therefore, the methods of enforcement have shifted from tracking routes to controlling supply chains, technical prowess, and digital distribution. 

This transformation coincided with the growth of China’s chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Currently, China has achieved global leadership in the synthesis of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), the bioactive components found in medicines (Ujwala, 2025) and hosts 160,000 to 400,000 chemical producers and suppliers (Felbab-Brown, 2022). It also dominates the global market for pharmaceutical precursors. Although most production is legal, the scale and decentralisation of the industry generate regulatory gaps, often falsely characterised as international state complicity. 

Thus, Beijing must deal with a sector that shifts faster than regulation does. Oversight is structurally restricted – not just eroded by a lack of political will. So, positioning China as a negligent state disrupts a key principle: geopolitics has preponderance of its cooperation with the US on synthetic drugs. 

Anti-narcotics collaboration between China and the US has failed repeatedly. Strategic distrust among states has turned drug control into a diplomatic pawn. In times of disagreement, over trade, military competition, and technology, drugs cooperation is one of the first to fall into disinterest. This dynamic became apparent following the US sanctioning China’s Ministry of Public Security, turning a technical partnership into another site of political turmoil. 

While often depicting China as the main driver of the US fentanyl crisis, American policymakers seldom engage with two overlooked realities. To begin with, China has expanded chemical regulation and collaborates with UN drug control agencies. Secondly, it faces a growing misuse struggle – an issue neglected by Western media outlets. Official registration rates are low, under 0.1 percent of the population, which suggests both active suppression and underreporting (NNCC, 2024). UNODC data states that over half of the country’s registered users are over 35, with methamphetamine and ketamine predominant (UNODC, 2023). China is thus neither a bystander nor a singular threat: it is a leading producer of precursor chemicals, and a destination for finished drug imports, further complicated by booming digital platforms. Beijing’s participation in synthetic drug trade mirrors an industry model laid out around scale, speed, and innovation. A structure designed to cater for legal pharmaceutical markets simultaneously provides space for illicit adaptation. 

Portraying synthetic drugs as a uniquely Chinese problem hides larger structural drivers. For example, the US opioid crisis, often referred to as a consequence of China’s misdeeds, preceded expansive foreign involvement, and was exacerbated by domestic drug practices. Blaming China alone shifts focus from these internal causes. No state can fully regulate illegalities, even as China pushes for more control of chemicals and markets through global finance, communication, and cross-border supply chains. 

If geopolitical competition allows for the suppression of counternarcotics cooperation, the synthetic drug market will increase, not because of intentional Chinese negligence, but simply because strategic competition has restricted collective action. The problem, then, is not a national failure, but a global system of power rivalries that limits development. 

Bibliography

Felbab-Brown, V. (2022). China and Synthetic Drugs: Geopolitics Trumps Counternarcotics Cooperation. [Online] Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-and-synthetic-drugs-geopolitics-trumps-counternarcotics-cooperation/ [Accessed 3 December 2025]

Office of National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC). (2023). China Drug Situation Report 2023. [Online] Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America  Available at: https://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zggs/202406/t20240620_11438701.htm [Accessed 3 December 2025]

Swanström, N., Yin, H. (2006). China’s War on Narcotics: Two Perspectives. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program,,.(2025). A Comprehensive Review of the Global Api Industry: Market Insight and Strategic Outlook. IOSR Journal of Dental and Medical Sciences, 24(1), pp. 21-27, 

UNODC. (2023). Executive Summary – World Drug Report 2023. [Online] United Nations: Office on Drugs and Crime. Avaliable at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Exsum_wdr2023.html [Accessed 3 December 2025]