Tariffs, Coercion and the Middle Powers

‘The power of the less powerful begins with honesty’.This is one of several key quotes from the speech Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave to the World Economic Forum (Carney, 2026). In a world where great powers use economic integration as a weapon, tariffs as leverage, and financial infrastructure as coercion, what can middle powers like Canada do (Carney, 2026)?

Invoking Czech dissident Václav Havel, Carney states that it is time to stop “living within a lie”, that we accept that “we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition”, that the old world is dying, if not already dead (Carney, 2026). This article argues that Middle powers must act honestly: first, by recognising the changes in the global order, and second, by demonstrating how they can respond effectively.

A Changing World

Globalisation is no longer a benign or purely economic system, but is increasingly being used by the great powers as a tool to enhance strategic interests. For a middle power, this is the clearest way in which the world has changed, as they are now being forced by these powers to make difficult choices, some of which are not in their economic interest. This is especially evident in the economic strategy adopted by the Trump administration. In 2026, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on several European countries if they did not concede regarding Greenland, with Trump continually arguing that the US ‘needs’ Greenland. This illustrates how great powers can leverage economic integration with middle powers, using tariffs and other economic tools to pursue geopolitical objectives rather than purely economic goals. Scholars note that this shift has undermined trust in multilateral trade frameworks, weakened traditional rules-based governance, and compelled other states to develop alternative coalitions and strategies to protect their economic interests (Won-Ho Kim, 2025).

As Aggarwal and Reddie (2025) note, this marks a clear departure from the 20th-century expectation that global markets and supply chains would primarily advance efficiency and interdependence. With this changing world becoming more and more apparent, if middle powers continue living as if they are in a 20th-century geopolitical situation, they will be at a strategic disadvantage. Therefore, it is clear that Middle powers need to change their approach.

What Can Be Done

Middle powers can influence a changing world by relying on multilateralism, coalition-building, and diplomacy. Aydin (2021) notes that middle powers have historically strengthened the liberal international order by engaging collectively in issues such as conflict mediation, security cooperation, and human rights, and argues that they can “punch above their weight” by focusing on niche areas where they are credible and trusted actors. This approach can be seen in the 2025 “Coalition of the Willing”, convened by the UK and France, which brought together over 30 countries, including middle powers like Canada, to coordinate support for Ukraine. Similarly, Canada’s proposed Defence, Security, and Resilience (DSR) Bank represents a new form of multilateral institutional innovation, pooling resources from multiple states to fund joint defence projects. These examples show that middle powers can navigate the changing world through collective action, using coalitions and institutions to pool resources, coordinate policy, and constrain great power dominance (Aydin, 2021). 

Conclusion

The current global order is increasingly being shaped by the strategic use of economic and political tools by great powers, forcing middle powers to adapt. As seen with Trump’s Greenland tariffs, economic integration can be leveraged for geopolitical aims, challenging traditional assumptions of globalisation (Won-Ho Kim, 2025). Middle powers, however, retain power through multilateralism, coalition-building, and niche diplomacy. Initiatives like the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ and the proposed DSR Bank demonstrate that by coordinating collectively, middle powers can influence outcomes, uphold stability, and limit the dominance of great powers in a changing world (Aydin, 2021).

Bibliography 

Aydin, U.A. (2021). Emerging middle powers and the liberal international order. International Affairs, 97(5), pp. 1377–1394,

Carney, MC. (2026) Principled and pragmatic: Canada’s path — Remarks by the Prime Minister to the World Economic Forum. [Online] Prime Minister of Canada. Available at: https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses (Accessed: 5 February 2026).

Kim, WHK. 2025. US tariff policy and a transformation of global trade architecture. Asia and the Global Economy. 5(2). pp.1-7 - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667111525000155 (Accessed 1 February 2026) 

Reddie, AWR, Aggarwal, VK.2025. New economic statecraft and global technology conflicts: The dilemma for middle powers. Business and Politics. 27(4). pp. 465 - 483 - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392235710_New_economic_statecraft_and_global_technology_conflicts_the_dilemma_for_middle_powers (Accessed 2 February 2026)