Trump and the Madman Theory

The “Madman Theory” is a concept in international relations wherein an actor leverages perceptions of irrationality to extract concessions. The rationale for this strategy is that irrationality prevents predictions of behaviour while also inducing fears of escalation, thereby allowing the “madmen” to gain leverage in negotiations. The notion itself is old, with Machiavelli (1996: 213) noting in 1517 that it could be “a very wise thing to simulate madness”; however, the modern term often refers to the foreign policy of Richard Nixon. Nixon instructed diplomats to imply to North Vietnamese leaders that he may be willing to use nuclear weaponry and used the heavy bombing of Cambodia to signal irrationality and a willingness to escalate. While a rational leader would refrain from nuclear conflict due to Mutually-Assured Destruction, Nixon hoped that perceptions of irrationality would scare the Vietnamese into making concessions.

It can be argued that Donald Trump has leveraged perceptions of irrationality in two main areas: first,  in conventional conflicts, and then within his trade policy. One instance in which Trump could be seen as employing the “Madman Theory” is in his handling of the Russo-Ukrainian war. His support for Ukraine’s military effort has wavered erratically, with him even ending intelligence sharing at one point. This unpredictability prevents the Ukrainians from viewing US support as guaranteed, thus allowing Trump to extract concessions from Zelensky, such as the recent mineral deal. Trump acted similarly by casting doubt on his commitment to NATO’s Article 5, resulting in many European leaders pledging increases in defence spending, a goal that had been unsuccessfully pursued by many of Trump’s predecessors (Lunday et al., 2025). 

Since re-entering office, Trump has used this theory in a relatively novel way, applying it to his tariff policies. He has rapidly changed and paused different tariff rates, while sharply escalating previous trade disputes with China. This unpredictable and escalatory behaviour defies economic orthodoxy (which would be seen as “rational” policy) while clearly being designed to intimidate, as Trump aims to negotiate new trade deals to redress what he views as unfair treatment of the United States. I’m inclined to believe these actions do represent the use of the madman theory, with Trump even referring to himself as a “crazy guy” (Seitz and Talmadge, 2020).

Having established how Trump employs the  “Madman Theory”, it remains to analyse the efficacy of his approach. Some academics have cast doubt on the strategy as a whole, with Samuel Seitz and Caitlin Talmadge arguing that “Madman behaviour … rarely, if ever, generates success” (Seitz and Talmadge, 2020). This is due to several factors, including the difficulty of providing clear signalling and backing up maximalist demands when engaging in “Madman” behaviour. Furthermore, it can be challenging to convince adversaries that you are actually erratic. Nixon’s approach largely fell flat in Vietnam as a result of these issues. When he raised the readiness of US forces in 1969, the USSR didn’t fully understand the signal and so “did not change its stance on Vietnam” (Seitz and Talmadge, 2020), while Ho Chi Minh’s government also gave minimal concessions as a result of the posturing and ultimately captured the entire country.

When evaluating the success of Trump’s erratic behaviour, it’s necessary to note his accomplishments.  The aforementioned concessions from NATO members and Ukraine are foreign policy victories achieved by the belief that Trump is an erratic president. Furthermore, his tariff policy has seen some benefits; the UK has reduced tariffs on US beef and ethanol (Department for Business and Trade, 2025, paras. 4-5). Despite this, the long-term reputational harm of this instability ought to be reckoned with. US allies could begin to distance themselves, viewing the US  as a poor security partner, and perhaps more pressingly, instability around trade could cause other economies to disengage from the US. This threat to US economic dominance could make adversaries such as China appear as more attractive partners. The beginnings of this shift can be seen in the words of world leaders, such as Singapore’s Prime Minister, who refer to a “post-American order” (Financial Times, 2025).

Furthermore, Trump’s unpredictable support for Ukraine’s war effort hasn’t caused Putin to cease his invasion. It could potentially embolden the autocrat if the wavering is viewed as a sign of weakness. As well as this, Trump’s erratic behaviour in Iran, swinging from negotiations to airstrikes, could further entrench the nuclear ambitions of its leadership (Little, 2025) rather than discourage activity. Tehran may look to North Korea as an example of successful deterrence if constructive engagement with the USA appears unworkable in the face of “mad” behaviour.

To conclude, despite some short-term successes, the broader outlook on Trump’s deployment of “Madman Theory” points to several potential failures alongside longer-term damage to US foreign relations and the wider global order it has cultivated. 

Bibliography 

Department for Business and Trade (2025). Update on UK-US Economic Prosperity Deal. [Online]. London: UK Government. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6855877f76eec44bf9d71dab/update-on-uk-us-economic-prosperity-deal.pdf [Accessed 25 November]. 

Financial Times (2025). Singapore’s prime minister warns of ‘messy’ transition to post-American order. [Online]. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/4bc713b0-4d0b-4e6c-9f7d-acdbd66231e6?sharetype=gift [Accessed 25 November] 

Little, A. (2025). How Trump is using the ‘Madman Theory’ to try to change the world (and it’s working). BBC News. [Online]. 06 July 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/czxww2kez0go [Accessed 25 November] 

Lunday, C., Traylor, J. and Kayali, L. (2024). Trump casts doubt on Article 5 commitment en route to NATO summit. [Online]. POLITICO. Last updated: 24 June 2025. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-nato-summit-sidesteps-article-5-mark-rutte-eu-defense-budget-russia-vladimir-putin-iran-israel-strikes-qatar/ [Accessed 25 November]

Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy. Translated from Italian by H.C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Seitz, S. and Talmadge, C. (2020). The Predictable Hazards of Unpredictability: Why Madman Behavior Doesn’t Work. The Washington Quarterly, 43(3), pp. 31-46. Available at: doi:10.1080/0163660X.2020.1810424